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TEXAS LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 46 July 1968 NUMBER 6
INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
ARTHUR H. TRAVERS, JR.*
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils.
It offends laws human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it
tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of the
Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each other,
it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that
no man can serve two masters. In either event it tends to ineffi-
ciency; for it removes incentives and destroys soundness of judg-
ment. It is undemocratic; for it rejects the platform: "A fair field
- and no favors,"-substituting the pull of privilege for the push
of manhood.
L. Brandeis, Other People's Money 35 (1914).
I. INTRODUCTION
The 1960's are witnessing another spasm of interest in the antitrust
problems posed by interlocks in corporate management. Similar bursts
of interest have occurred in the past, and on each occasion some al-
teration in the federal policy toward interlocks has occurred. The
earliest and most sustained of these bursts of interest took place during
the Progressive Era and produced section 8 of the Clayton Act,' the
only portion of the antitrust laws to deal expressly with interlocks
among ordinary, unregulated commercial and industrial corporations.
This section, which is the focus of current attention, provides in part
as follows:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or
more corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and
undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000 engaged
in whole or in part in commerce, other than banks, banking
associations, trust companies, and common carriers subject to
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kansas. B.A., 1957, Grinnell College; LL.B.,
1962, Harvard University.
1 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1964).
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the [Interstate Commerce] Act ... if such corporations are or
shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business and
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of
competition between them would constitute a violation of any
of the antitrust laws .... 2
During the New Deal the investigations of the Temporary Na-
tional Economic Committee touched on the interlock question, but
only in an incidental manner;3 there was no contemporaneous change
in antitrust policy, but some restriction on interlocking relations was
written into every major New Deal regulatory statute.4 Immediately
following World War II, the Department of Justice publicized a study
on the extent of interlocks; the Department indicated it was dealing
with interlocks on an informal basis and was seeking voluntary resig-
nations rather than pressing for lawsuits.5 The Department was evi-
dently successful in securing the voluntary resignations of directors who
were informed that their continuing in both positions raised important
antitrust problems.6 But in February, 1952, the Department, while
confirming its continuing, desire to seek compliance with section 8
without litigation, filed four actions based squarely on the section.7
2 Another portion of § 8 places limits on horizontal interlocking directorates among
banks and trust companies; it has been amended from time to time although the portion
of § 8 quoted in the text has not been. Section 10 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 20
(1964), prohibits a common carrier subject to the Interstate Commerce Act from having
annual dealings in excess of $50,000 with any supplier with which it shares a director,
president, manager, or purchasing or selling officer except by competitive bids regulated
by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Since the focus of this article is on the basic
antitrust rules applicable to unregulated corporations, it will deal only tangentially with
the rules applicable to regulated corporations.
3 See D. LYNCH, CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC PowER 231-32, 359 (1946).
4 These include the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 212 (1964);
Federal Power Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. § 825d (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1985, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1964); Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (1964). A
useful chart of the federal statutes appears in Jacobs, Interlocks, 29 ABA ANTTRUST SEC-
TION 204, 214-15 (1965). For a fuller analysis of the similarities and differences among the
various statutes see Note, Interlocking Directorates: A Study in Desultory Regulation, 29
IND. L.J. 429 (1954).
5 See Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YAIE
L.J. 1266, 1270-71 (1950), According to Mr. Kramer, then a high-ranking official in the
Antitrust Division, the Department unearthed about 1500 interlocks; he did not indicate
how many of these violated § 8.
6 ld. at 1271.
I The press release stated:
The Antitrust Division will maintain a continuing watch over the directorship
field and, in cases in which individuals continue to serve on the boards of com-
peting companies after notification by Division that they are violating this stat-
ute,.it will proceed to fi le legal actions to terminate such directorships.
Department of Justice Press Release, Feb. 27, 1952. Three of the four cases filed involved
John M. Hancock; the fourth involved Sidney J. Weinberg. See United States v. W. T.
Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
At about the same time the Federal Trade Commission submitted a comprehensive
report on interlocking directorates, thus demonstrating that agency's continuing concern
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These tangible expressions of policy mirror a lingering apprehen-
sion in many quarters that interlocking relationships are the visible
ties linking a small group of men who wield vast political and eco-
nomic power. Since many conceive of the antitrust laws as designed to
prevent concentrations of power, the idea that all interlocking direc-
torships must be smashed has remained one of the intellectual under-
currents coursing beneath the surface of antitrust activity. Neverthe-
less, the amount of federal litigation directed against interlocks has
always been paltry." Statistics on the number of lawsuits filed under
section 8, however, fail to tell the whole story. The FTC has made
some effort to deal with interlocks via section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,9 and the Department has on occasion employed the
Sherman Act.' Moreover, the absence of litigation may indicate that
with the problem. FTC, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES (1951). The report re-
vealed a great many interlocks among the corporations studied. For the most part the
interlocks were vertical or indirect and thus not covered by § 8.
s The Department of Justice brought only ten cases to enforce § 8 and five cases to
enforce § 10 during the period beginning with the effective date of the Clayton Act and
ending in January, 1965. STAFF OF HOUSE COIM. ON TaE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., lST SESS.,
REPORT ON INTERLOCKS IN CORoRATE MANAGEMENT 227 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter
cited as STAFF REPORT]. The cases filed on February 27, 1952 were the Department's first
major efforts. See Kramer, supra note 5, at 1270. During the same period the FTC filed
only thirteen complaints under § 8; twelve of these were dismissed when the directors in-
volved resigned one of the directorships. STAF REPORT 227. One of the few issues fairly
well settled in this area is that the discontinuance of the interlock does not automatically
render the case moot. See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953). The
thirteenth case ended in a cease-and-desist order entered by consent. STAFF REPORT 102.
0 Central Linen Serv. Co., Nos. 8558, 8559, TRADE REG. REP. 5625.60 (FTC, Mar. 13,
1964) (consent order).
30 Prohibitions against various kinds of interlocks appear in the following consent de-
crees: United States v. True Temper Corp., 1959 Trade Cas. 69,441 (N.D. Ill.); United
States v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 1958 Trade Cas. 69,192 (W.D. Mo.); United States v.
Linen Supply Institute, 1958 Trade Cas. 69,120 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. National
Cranberry Ass'n, 1957 Trade Cas. 68,850 (D. Mass.); United States v. Greyhound Corp.,
1957 Trade Cas. 68,756 (N.D. Ill.); United States v. National Linen Serv. Corp., 1956
Trade Cas. 68,598 (N.D. Ga.); United States v. Shubert, 1956 Trade Cas. 68,272
(S.D.N.Y.); United States v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,169
(N.D. Ill.); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,161 (S.D. Ohio);
United States v. Northland Milk & Ice Cream Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,091 (D. Minn.);
United States v. American MonoRail Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 68,041 (N.D. Ohio); United
States v. R.L. Polk & Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 67,943 (E.D. Mich.); United States v. General
Ry. Signal Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 67,992 (W.D.N.Y.); United States v. Pittsburgh Crushed
Steel Co., 1954 Trade Cas. 67,892 (N.D. Ohio); United States v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 1954 Trade Cas. 67,829 (N.D. Cal.); United States v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
1954 Trade Cas. 67,801 (N.D. Ala.); United States v. United States Rubber Co., 1954
Trade Cas. 67,771 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 1952-53 Trade
Cas. 67,248 (E.D.N.Y. 1952); United States v. L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 1950-51
Trade Cas. 62,908 (E.D. Mich. 1951); United States v. Textile Mach. Works, 1950-51
Trade Cas. 62,709 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). Some of these interlocks would not be covered by
existing § 8.
The Department also attacked interlocking directorates between securities issuers and
investment bankers in United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), a Sher-
man Act case. The Government contended that the defendants had used interlocking di-
rectorates to stifle competition for the underwriting of securities. With some asperity
Judge Medina decided the Government had failed to prove its case. For a debate on Judge
Medina's perceptiveness see Steffen, The Investment Bankers' Case: Some Observations,
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the Department's campaign to secure voluntary compliance is notably
successful. 1 And obviously the very existence of section 8 prevents
many illegal interlocks from arising in the first place. The belief per-
sists, however, that the Government's attack on corporate interlocks
under the antitrust laws has been conducted with all the observable
success and fervor that attended the major campaigns of the Italian
army during World War II.
Several factors may account for the Department's lack of success.
For example, a director may often avoid a judicial decision by resign-
ing from one of the boards as soon as suit is filed. This does not make
the case moot since the Government is entitled to injunctive relief
whenever necessary to prevent a recurrence of the interlocking rela-
tion.12 The cases give little guidance, however, on exactly what facts
will be deemed sufficient to indicate a reasonable possibility of recur-
rence. 13 It may be said that a voluntary resignation, even if under pres-
sure, gives the Government much of the relief it could obtain in a
lawsuit, and at much less cost. Although this is true, it ignores the
interest of the Government in making law as well as winning cases;
precious little law has developed regarding interlocks.
The enforcement agencies claim that the loopholes in section 8
are the major factor preventing enforcement of the antitrust laws
against interlocks. Since 1950 they have requested legislation to cor-
rect those weaknesses.' 4 In 1964 Representative Celler, the Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, called for new, tough legislation
to plug the holes in section 8 and directed the Antitrust Subcommit-
tee Staff to conduct a study and submit recommendations. 15 One of
64 YALE L.J. 169 (1954); Whitney, The Investment Bankers' Case-Including a Reply to
Professor Steffen, 64 YALE L.J. 319 (1955); Steffen, The Investment Bankers' Case: Ob-
servations in Rejoinder, 64 Yv.aL L.J, 863 (1955); Whitney, The Investment Bankers' Case:
A Surrejoinder, 64 YALa L.J. 873 (1955). The' essence of the debate was that Professor
Steffen, who helped prepare the Government's case, thought the judge muffed his job
rather badly. Mr. Whitney, who led the successful defense, thought the opinion a piece
of judicial statesmanship.
11 See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 209.
12 United States v. WT. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953).
13 In Grant the Supreme Court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
in dismissing the Government's complaint despite the following facts: (1) Hancock re-
fused to terminate: his interlocking directorates until after the suit was fled in spite of
five yasof administrative efforts; (2) he refused to acknowledge that the interlocks were
illegal; and (3) he refused to promise not to commit similar violations in the future. The
Court noted, however, that if it had been "sitting as a trial court, this showing might be
persuasive." Id. at 634. In a subsequent case, United States v. Newmont Mining Co., 1964
Trade Cas. 71,030 (SD.N.Y.), the district court denied the defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment in the face of essentially the same showing. The matter now rests with
the discretion of the trial judge, and there is very little circumscribing that discretion.
14 E.g., Kramer, supra note 5, at 1274-75; STAFF REPORT 102.
15 110 CONG. RFe. 5766 (1964).
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the recommendations of the Staff Report was a model bill broadening
the coverage of section 8, as recommended by the enforcement agencies,
to be used as a basis for a full investigation into the actual impact of
corporate interlocks.16 In October, 1965, Representative Celler intro-
duced H.R. 11572 embodying the recommendations of the Staff Re-
port;17 the bill died in committee when the 89th Congress ended.
Representative Celler introduced a similar bill in January, 1967, but
there has been little observable progress since it was sent to commit-
tee.
The enforcement agencies had pointed to four separate loop-
holes in section 8. First, section 8 is limited to situations in which
the person through whom the interlock is effected is a director of both
corporations. If he were a director in one company and a nondirector
officer in the other, section 8 would not apply even though the situa-
tions are functionally identical. Secondly, section 8 does not cover
vertical interlocks-interlocks between two companies at successive
levels of production or distribution. Thirdly, section 8 does not cover
indirect interlocks. For example, two members of an investment bank-
ing firm may serve on the boards of competing corporations although
the same individual may not serve on both boards. Fourthly, section
8 does not cover interlocks between corporations only potentially re-
lated horizontally or vertically.'
8
The Celler bill, which is tailored to meet these objections, makes
it unlawful
for any natural person who is a director, officer, or employee
with management functions, of any person engaged in com-
merce at the same time to hold the position of director, offi-
cer, or employee with management functions, or to have a
representative or nominee who represents such person as a
director, officer, or employee with management functions, in
any other person (a) who is an actual or potential competitor,
or (b) who is an actual or potential customer, or supplier, or
source of credit or capital, or (c) whose principal business in
purpose or in fact is the holding of stock in, or control of,
any other person in commerce. 19
16 SrAF REPORT 225-32.
17 For a full description of the bill, complete with a parade of horribles that might
ensue from its enactment, see Lombard, The Corporate Management Interlocks Bill, 21
Bus. LAw. 879 (1966).
18 See Letter from FTC Chairman Paul Dixon to Representative Celler, Nov. 30, 1962,
in STAFF REPORT 102.
19 See CCH, CONGRESSIONAL INDEX 4364. The present limitation requiring at least one
corporation to have $1,000,000 in aggregate capital, surplus, and undivided profits is re-
tained. There is a new exemption for interlocking relationships "when one of the persons
1968]
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Thus the Celler bill deals explicitly with three of the four weaknesses
pointed out by the enforcement agencies; it does not literally cover
indirect interlocks. Nevertheless, to the extent that those interlocks
involve vertical interlocks, the bill would cover them too. In the hypo-
thetical case in which two members of the same investment banking
firm served on the boards of competing corporations, the bill's pro-
hibitions on vertical interlocks would destroy the relationship2 0
Since an avowed purpose of the Celler bill was to provoke dis-
cussion, this article will focus on the bill, which embodies long re-
quested changes and raises the pertinent questions. For the purpose
of obtaining a better understanding of why section 8 emerged in its
present form, consideration will initially be given to the role played
by interlocks in the thinking of the Progressive Era. Discussion will
then focus on some of the issues presented by the attempt to amend
section 8, both in terms of underlying theory and of precise formula-
tion in the Celler bill.
II. THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
A. The Political Setting
As early as 1908 the Democratic platform had called for a law
"preventing the duplication of directors among competing corpora-
tions."21 In 1912 the antitrust plank in the Democratic platform called
for the use of criminal sanctions against "trusts and trust officials" and
suggested supplemental legislation that would lead to "the prevention
of holding companies, of interlocking directors, of stock watering, of
discrimination in price, and the control by any one corporation of so
large a proportion of any industry as to make it a menace to com-
petitive conditions .... -"22 Unlike the Democratic platform, neither the
Republican nor the Progressive platform attempted an enumeration
of practices to be prohibited; both platforms instead espoused the idea
of a federal trade commission. The Progressives forthrightly insisted
involved directly or indirectly owns more than 50 per centum of the voting stock of the
other or others, or where 50 per centum or more of the voting stock of each of the per-
sons involved ... is directly or indirectly owned by the same person." Finally, the At-
torney General is empowered to approve an interlocking relationship upon "due showing
... that such relationship in consideration of all the relevant factors accords to the maxi-
mum extent practicable with the objectives of the antitrust laws."
20 Under the Celler bill, which reaches interlocks between potential customers and
suppliers, it would make no difference whether the investment banking firm were actually
selling its services to the competing corporations. If it were decided to restrict the act to
interlocks between corporations with an existing customer-supplier relationship, of course
some transactions would have to be proved; these would ordinarily be present.
21 K. PORTER & D. JOHNsON, NATIONAL PARTY PLAT ORms 1840-1956, at 146 (1956).
22 Id. at 169.
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on the inevitability and desirability of combination and advanced the
commission as an instrument for holding these powerful combinations
accountable to the law. The Republicans urged a commission as an
aid to the vigorous enforcement of the Sherman Act, but did not spec-
ify the exact role the commission should play.23
These differences in platforms mirrored a fundamental cleavage
among the parties on the trust issue. The Progressives subscribed to
Theodore Roosevelt's view that competition was no longer a viable
principle of economic organization, but was a divisive social force in-
terfering with the attainment of the harmony and social solidarity
that Roosevelt sought.24 The Democrats, on the other hand, shunned
the idea of a commission since it presupposed an undesirable amount
of governmental involvement in the economy. Preservation of com-
petitive conditions and the eradication of private monopoly through
the flat prohibition of specifically defined practices such as interlock-
ing directorates was the heart of their program.25 Their platform,
however, suggested a ban on all interlocks, not merely interlocks be-
tween competitors.2
6
As it happened, the trust issue became the core issue of the 1912
campaign. Woodrow Wilson had been seeking an appealing issue that
would dramatize the differences between his program and Roose-
velt's. Louis D. Brandeis convinced Wilson that the trust question
was such an issue and began to shape Wilson's thinking on that ques-
tion.2 - Although Wilson was greatly influenced by Brandeis, the two
men approached the trust question from different standpoints. Bran-
deis was an economist, a social scientist.28 Wilson was a moralist who
had a keen appreciation of the power of oratory to move men and
was not one to clutter a clear moral issue with the baggage of ab-
stract theory or masses of data.29 Wilson did not find economic theory
23 Id. at 178, 184.
24 See S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914, at 88-89 (1957).
2 5 Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 14,
25 (1964).
20 The ban was apparently intended to be part of a federal corporation law. The
Democrats of 1912 seemed aware that the corporate form itself posed social, moral, and
political questions; the platform indicates that direct federal control of that form was
contemplated as a solution.
27 See A. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 20-21 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as LINK]; A. MASON, BRANDEIS 377-78 (1946) [hereinafter cited as MASON]. See also
Leuchtenburg, Introduction: Woodrow Wilson and The New Freedom, in W. WILSON,
THE NEw FREEDOM 1, 4-5 (W. Leuchtenburg ed. 1961).
28 The classic example. of Brandeis' method is his handling of the case of Muller v.
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908). A good account of the episode may be found in S. KONR s KY,
THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS 85-91 (1961).
29 E.g., T. COCHRAN & W. MILER, THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 193-94 (rev. ed. 1961);
Leuchtenburg, supra note 27, at 5-6.
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stimulating and publicly referred to economists as "those tedious per-
sons."8 0 To him, "competition" connoted a liberating force in society
that enabled each man to capitalize on his own abilities rather than
a structural model of a market.81
In his campaign speeches Wilson emphasized that personal rela-
tions between man and man had broken down with the development
of the giant business corporation. The hierarchical structure of the
corporation centralized the power of decision in a few hands. The
remainder of the people were mere employees with little chance for
advancement.8 2 Moreover, the few at the top had allied with the po-
litical leaders to solidify their already commanding position, and the
people were effectively denied access to their representatives. 3 Fur-
thermore, the information needed for effective political action was
denied to the people. In politics as in industry they had lost control
of their destiny; they had to be content with what their "guardians"
gave them.84 To Wilson, the most serious consequence of this was that
the spirit of enterprise and self-reliance of the people would be eroded
and America's ability to regenerate itself would thus be forever lost.85
Wilson denied that technological imperatives demanded the de-
gree of concentration existing in American industry. He distinguished
between "big business," which was to some extent inevitable, and
"trusts," which were not.86 Many of the vast combinations had, by
artful contrivance, been expanded to the point that diseconomies of
large scale had set in.3 7 If smaller, more efficient rivals could enter the
field, the trusts would topple. Wilson's program aimed at outlawing
SOW. WILSON, THm NEW FREEoM 101 (W. Leuchtenburg ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited
as WILSON].
31 An excellent study of Wilson's background and thought on economic issues is W.
DIAMOND, THE ECONOMIC THOUGHT OF WOODROW WILSON (1943).
32WHSON 20-22, 25-26.
33 Id. at 29-30, 78-85.
34 Id. at 47-58.
85 E.g., id. at 39, 59-64 (essay entitled Life Comes From the Soil). The following ex-
tract capsulizes Wilson's views:
America stands for opportunity. America stands for a free field and no favor.
America stands for a government responsive to the interests of all.... We pur-
pose to prevent private monopoly by law, to see to it that the methods by which
monopolies have been built up are legally made impossible. We design that the
limitations on private enterprise shall be removed, so that the next generation of
youngsters ... will not have to become proteges of benevolent trusts, but Will be
free to go about making their own lives what they will....
Id. at 131-32.
86Id. at 102. Interestingly, Wilson draws much the same distinction that has been
drawn by the Supreme Court in he anathematized Standard Oil and American Tobacco
cases. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 1, 75 (1911); United States v. Amer-
ican Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181-82 (1911). The basic idea seems to have been that




those practices that prevented the entry of "Jack the Giant Killer":
price discrimination, tying contracts, exclusive dealing arrangements,
and a "community of interest" between the trusts and the capitalists
that prevented the potential entrant from securing needed capital. It
was here that interlocks played their role.
The credit of the country, Wilson wrote, had become "danger-
ously centralized" in the hands of the Money Trust-"capitalists who
wish to keep the economic development of the country under their
own eye and guidance" and who, even if honest and public-spirited,
"by reason of their own limitations, chill and check and destroy gen-
uine economic freedom."38 This Money Trust crushed those whom
it found troublesome. Alluding to the Pujo Committee investiga-
tions, Wilson outlined the role that interlocks played in facilitating the
Money Trust's operations: The directorate of any great bank was
known to be interlaced with as many as sixty security issuers, rail-
roads, manufacturing corporations, and distributing companies. This
had led to a widespread public distrust of the bankers' motives and
a suspicion that their objectives might be dangerous to a free society:
[W]hat we have got to do is to disentangle this colossal "com-
munity of interest".... [N]o single, avowed, combination is
big enough for the United States to be afraid of; but when
all the combinations are combined . . . then there is some-
thing that even the government of the nation itself might
come to fear .... 39
Although Wilson's discussion of interlocks highlighted the possi-
bility of a supercombination, it also suggested another, less dramatic,
aspect of the interlock question: the elimination of opportunities for
young men. Wilson was less concerned with general mobility than
with the reduced chance to get to the top. If one thinks of a place on
the board of a large corporation as the top, there are only so many
spots available. Any man holding more than one spot restricts the
opportunities available. From this angle the interlock problem be-
comes one of simple arithmetic and the relations among the firms
thus linked become unimportant. Studies that simply indicate the
number of directorships held by a given individual without much
consideration of the relationship among the firms attest to the per-
sistence of this strain of thought.40
38Id. at 111-12.
3Od. at 110-11, 115.
40 The TNEG and the 1965 STAFF REPORT went in for this sort of nose-counting. See




Four days before Wilson's first inaugural the Pujo Committee
presented its report on the Money Trust. The report confirmed sus-
picions that there was indeed a Money Trust, that it was directed by a
handful of powerful investment bankers headed by the Morgan inter-
ests, and that the power wielded by this group represented a serious
threat to American democracy.41 Brandeis approved the report as far as
it went, but deemed the Committee's recommendations "entirely inade-
quate." 42 His series of articles on the Money Trust popularized the
Committee's findings and riveted public attention to the practices of
what Brandeis termed "our financial oligarchy." 43
The core of the Money Trust, Brandeis wrote, was a small group
of leading investment banking firms that had eliminated competition
among its members and, through financial patronage, had induced
smaller but still important investment banking houses to act as job-
bers or distributors for them instead of distributing securities on their
own accounts. Similar patronage had elicited the cooperation of hun-
dreds of smaller firms scattered throughout the country. Thus the
"inner group" controlled a strategic position between investors and
security issuers and, from this position, had expanded to acquire con-
trol over. the nation's quick capital by controlling the depositories,
commercial banks, trust companies, and insurance companies. At the
same time they gained control of the issuers of securities. 44
In this endeavor the interlocking directorship was the Money
Trust's most effective device:
The term "interlocking directorates" is here used in a broad
sense as including all intertwined conflicting interests, what-
ever the form, and by whatever device effected. The objection
extends alike to contracts of a corporation whether with one
of its directors individually, or with a firm of which he is a
member, or with another corporation in which he is inter-
ested as an officer or director or stockholder. The objection
extends likewise to men holding the inconsistent position of
director in two potentially competing corporations, even if
those corporations do not actually deal with each other.45
Brandeis criticized the prevailing common-law rule that contracts be-
tween a corporation and one of its directors, and contracts between
41 Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and 504
To Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money 'and Credit 129-30 (1913), quoted in
R. ROBERTSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 321 (2d ed. 1964).
42 MASON 413.
43 L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEoPLE'S MONEY (2d ed. 1932) [hereinafter cited as BRANDEIS].
44Id. at 28-44.
45 Id. at 51-52.
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corporations having a common director, are not void but merely void-
able. He thought these contracts should be void to protect the share-
holders who failed to get the benefit of disinterested judgment from
all their trustees and the consumers to whom the costs of graft and
inefficiency were passed.4 6 But the most compelling reason for pro-
hibiting interlocking directorates was the impossibility of breaking
the power of the Money Trust "without putting an end to the prac-
tice in the larger corporations. '47 Brandeis dramatized his point with
evidence showing that the members of J. P. Morgan & Company and
the directors "of their controlled trust companies and of the First
National and National City Bank together" held 341 directorships
in 112 corporations having aggregate resources or capitalization of
22,245,000,000 dollars.
48
Therefore, Brandeis referred to all the problems that the Cel-
ler bill now seeks to bring within section 8. In defining "director" in
functional rather than in formal terms49 Brandeis noted that the shar-
ing of officers could be as troublesome as the sharing of directors; he
dwelt at length on vertical interlocks; he alluded to the problems of
indirect interlocks; he specifically pointed out that interlocks between
potential competitors created problems. Of course he also touched on
the restriction of opportunity and the threat of a supercombination.
Wilson and Brandeis saw the first fruitful results of their work
on January 8, 1914, when it was announced that J. P. Morgan, Jr.
and many of his associates were withdrawing from the boards of thirty
corporations. Wilson was initially skeptical, but was assured by ad-
visers that the impact of the announcement had been profound and
that it signaled a willingness on the part of big business to capitulate
in the face of his assaults. 0 Although elated, Wilson asked Congress
for tougher antitrust legislation on January 20, 1914.
40 A similar critique of conventional state corporation law may be found in Pam,
Interlocking Directorates, The Problem and Its Solution, 26 HARv. L. REv. 467 (1913). In
most states today, a contract between two corporations sharing a director may be attacked
by either corporation on the ground that it is unfair, even if a disinterested majority of
both boards voted for the contract. See generally R. BAKER & W. CARY, CASES ON CORPORA-
TioNs 452-69 (3d ed. 1959).
4
7 BRANDEIS 62.
48 Id. at 30-33. Brandeis was also able to construct a partly supposititious "endless
chain" of transactions between corporations that counted J.P. Morgan or one of his asso-
dates among their directors. Id. at 52-54.
49 It might be asked why the FTC could not urge this functional definition of "direc-
tors" under present § 8. The insuperable obstacle seems to be that in § 10 and in that
portion of § 8 dealing with banks, Congress clearly used "director" in a formal sense as
designating a position and not as a substitute for "manager."




In his address to Congress Wilson spoke exuberantly about the
end of the antagonism between big business and government and the
dawn of an era of good feeling51 and claimed that business awaited
laws which will effectually prohibit and prevent such inter-
locking of personnel of the directorates of great corporations
... as in effect result in making those who borrow and those
who lend practically one and the same, those who sell and
those who buy but the same persons trading with one an-
other under different names and in different combinations,
and those who affect to compete in fact partners and masters
of some whole field of business .... 52
In this speech Wilson returned to his campaign theme: The legis-
lation would do more than eliminate existing evils; it would create
opportunities and open "the field.., to scores of men who have been
obliged to serve when their abilities entitled them to direct." He also
asked for prohibitions on certain unfair practices and the creation of
a federal commission with investigatory and advisory powers to aid
in antitrust enforcement.
Two days later Representative Clayton had embodied the Pres-
ident's requests in two bills.53 One bill created a trade commission;
the other contained the amendments to the Sherman Act, including
prohibitions, enforced by criminal sanctions, on exclusive-dealing ar-
rangements, tying contracts, price discrimination, holding companies,
and interlocking directorates. As enacted, the Clayton Act omitted the
criminal penalties and banned price discrimination, tying arrange-
ments, exclusive-dealing clauses, and holding companies only insofar
as the effect of these practices would be "to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 54
Section 8, however, fared better. The House committee amended the
bill to provide that at least one of the interlocked corporations must
have one million dollars in aggregated capital, surplus, and undivided
profits-a limitation fully consistent with the Brandeis-Wilson view
that the interlock presented a problem only when used to join large
51 More experienced in dealing with big business, Brandeis was less sanguine: "Con-
fidentially, I think he rather overdid the era of good feeling." MASoN 402.
52 H.R. RE-P. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1914).
53 51 CONG. REc. 2142 (1914).
54 38 Stat. 730 (1914). Senator Reed of Missouri described the effect of the legislative
process: "When the Clayton bill was first written, it was a raging lion with a mouth full
of teeth. It has degenerated to a tabby cat with soft gums, a plaintive mew, and an
anemic appearance." LN 72.
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corporations and one that is preserved by today's proposed amend-
ments. The Senate merely removed the criminal penalties without
changing the standard of illegality.
As early as April, 1914, substantial business opposition to the Clay-
ton bill had developed.55 Wilson himself began to doubt the wisdom
of the bill's inflexible approach; its criminal sanctions seemed harsh
and its method of clear-cut definition of certain offenses might prove
too rigid to deal adequately with the creativity of the trust builder.
By June he had made up his mind.
Although Brandeis had written that Wilson's original legislative
proposals, including the request for a weak commission, had "paved
the way for about all I have asked for,"56 he had been working with
George Rublee on a bill to create a trade commission with broad
powers to prohibit unfair trade practices. 51 These proposals were sub-
sequently embodied in a bill introduced by Representative Stevens,
but the Stevens bill had been killed in committee.58 On June 10, 1914,
five days after the Clayton bill and the bill establishing a weak com-
mission 9 had been approved by the House, Wilson told Brandeis,
Rublee, and Stevens that he would make the proposal for a strong
commission the heart of his program. This switch must have been
hard for Wilson to make. It meant federal involvement in the econ-
omy to an unprecedented extent and espousing a position that, super-
ficially at least, seemed identical to Roosevelt's. Nevertheless, Wilson
worked hard to marshal Senate support for the strong commission. 60
When the trade commission emerged from the Senate, it had been
given regulatory power, and the House was won over in conference.
But after Wilson became committed to the Brandeis-Rublee approach,
he virtually ignored the Clayton Act. 61
This shift of emphasis from the Clayton bill, with its philosophy
of specific definition, in favor of a regulatory commission, with power
to deal with "unfair methods of competition," seems to have been a




58 Baum & Baker, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing
Process of Redefinition, 7 Vir.. L. REv. 517, 526 (1962).
59 Representative Covington had introduced a bill creating a commission with in-
vestigatory and advisory powers. See S. RET'. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1914). This
bill did not differ significantly from the Trade Commission Bill introduced earlier by
Representative Clayton. See Baum & Baker, supra note 58, at 525.




who understood the interlock problem and who might otherwise have
worked to amend the Clayton bill may have felt that a bitter struggle
to broaden the coverage of the Clayton bill would be unduly costly
since the commission could handle any interlock not covered as an
"unfair method of competition." Another factor was the domination
of the thinking about interlocks by the image of the Money Trust.
By the middle of 1914 the threat from that quarter seemed much re-
duced. The Money Trust's power stemmed its control over the money
market during a period of high demand for capital.62 But this demand
had been slowing, and some later commentators believe that the bank-
ers themselves had been forced to stimulate it.(3 In any event, the panic
of 1907 had shaken much of the faith that had been placed in the
bankers. Moreover, the previously enacted Federal Reserve Act was
viewed as a direct attack on the problems of the money supply. 64 Also
the elder J. P. Morgan had died on March 31, 1913, thus depriving
the Money Trust of the personality who many deemed indispensable
to its continued power. 65 A final factor was the business opposition to
the Clayton bill; congressmen responsive to this wanted the weakest
possible measure.66 It is thus clear that Congress did not want to in-
clude any other interlocks under the rigid prohibition of section 8;
it is not clear, however, that Congress deliberately refused to change
section 8 because it wished to exclude all other interlocks from anti-
trust coverage.
67
III. THE ISSUES OF TODAY
A. General Observations
The present proposal to expand the coverage of section 8 raises
again several issues about interlocks raised during the Progressive Era
and then left unanswered. The 1965 Staff Report enumerates these
issues. First are the matters of antitrust significance: "(1) impairment
or elimination of competition between the firms in which interlock-
ing directors provide an effective liaison; (2) preferential treatment in
the supply of material and credit to favored companies; and (3) with-
6
2 See T. COCHRAN & W. MILLER, supra note 29, at 150; R. ROBERTSON, supra note 41,
at 320.
63 T. CocmAN & W. MILLER, supra note 29, at 188-89.
64 R. ROBERTSON, supra note 41, at 322.
65 Brandeis felt that Morgan or one of similar stature would be required to achieve
the objectionable results at which the act was aimed. See Hearings Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on Trust Legislation, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 943 (1914).
66 According to 4 R. BARER, supra note 50, at 377-80, the hand of the opposition was
strengthened by a depression that occurred during the summer of 1914.
67 But see Jacobs, supra note 4, at 213.
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holding of credit and capital from 'outside' competitors." Second is
the conflict-of-interest problem when the corporations deal with each
other. Third is the adverse effect on the quality of management as the
overburdened director stops managing and the elimination of oppor-
tunity tends to "constrict the management pool." Last is the fear that
so much power will be concentrated in so few hands as to be a threat
to a free society.68 The Progressive Era discussions of the interlock
question dealt with all these facets. If we have made any progress, it
lies in our recognition that certain problems are conventionally con-
sidered of antitrust significance and others are not.
In essence, the proposed legislation would establish a rule of per
se illegality for interlocking relationships not now covered by section
8.69 If this new rule is to be consistent with the logic behind per se
illegality, there must be some determination that each class of inter-
locks is so likely to have an adverse impact on competition and so
unlikely to improve competition, that dispensing with an examination
of the effects of any individual interlock is warranted.1°
An interlock not covered by section 8 is not immune from attack
under the antitrust laws. To the extent that interlocks may be reached
under the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act,71 alternative standards exist for judging the legality of interlocks,
and these may be evolved on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, under
these statutes the courts and the Commission have developed rules
of per se illegality for other business practices such as price-fixing,
72
68 STAFF REPORT 17.
69 It may be thought that the requirement that one of the linked corporations have
$1,000,000 in capital, surplus, and undivided earnings, or the exemption in the proposed
amendments for interlocks where one corporation owns more than 50% of the voting stock
of the others or the same person owns more than 50% of the voting stock of the linked
corporations makes the per se label inapplicable. But the imposition upon the Government
of the burden of establishing the existence of one or two triggering facts, in addition to
establishing the existence of the arrangement, is not necessarily inconsistent with a rule
of per se illegality, which eliminates the necessity of inquiring into the effects of the par-
ticular arrangement in the case. Cf. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under
the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50, 51, 59 (1958).
70 See C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 143 (1959).
71 It would be beyond the scope of this article to canvass the issue of § 5's relation to
the other antitrust laws; for those interested in the problem, the literature is extensive.
E.g., Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
With the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. RtEv. 821 (1961); Pearson, Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act as Antitrust: A Comment, 47 B.U.L. Rav. 1 (1967). It
may be noted, however, that on several occasions the section has been used to reach prac-
tices not covered by the Clayton Act yet identical to proscribed practices in their impact.
See generally Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965); FTC v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Serv. Co., 844 U.S. 392 (1953).
72 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
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resale-price maintenance,73 and group boycotts.7 4 Hence, the rejection
of the proposed legislation would not preclude the evolution of a
per se rule with respect to interlocks; it would simply shift from the
Legislature to the courts the responsibility of deciding whether a per
se rule is warranted. Since the courts can draw on the experience of
concrete cases and since very little is known about the actual effects
of interlocks,7 5 letting the courts decide may be the wisest course. In
either case, we must endeavor to develop some framework for analysis.
The following tentative analysis is offered as a possible spur to that
development.
B. The Talent Market
The market for directors or other high-level executive talent is,
in a sense, like any other market. Candidates for executive positions
offer their services in the market-place to the consumers of talent-
the corporations. A major premise of the antitrust laws is that the
consumers in any market are presumably best able to decide what
they want and the antitrust laws should serve to maximize consumer
choice and satisfaction.78 The most prevalent defense of interlocks is
that they make available to the employing companies the best men
available.77 Any restriction on interlocking directorates, or other inter-
locks, however slight, restricts the freedom of choice of the buying
corporations. Telling Corporation X that it may not have a given in-
dividual on its board because he also serves on the board of Corpora-
tion Y takes the decision away from the consumer; it forces Corpora-
tion X to take less than it deems best. It is no answer to say that if
the particular individual is on the board of Corporation Y and also on
the board of ten or fifteen other corporations, he will not be able to
devote enough time to the affairs of Corporation X. Assuming Cor-
poration X is fully informed about his commitments, Corporation X
73 Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 873 (1911).
74 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 859 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators'
Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 812 U.S. 457 (1941). Actually the status of boycotts is less clear than
the text would indicate. See Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act:
Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. Rav. 1165 (1959). Nevertheless, I believe
most observers do so categorize them.
75 STArT REPORT 229-30.
76 Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUm. L. Rav. 363, 365 (1965). Even
those commentators who would not agree that this is the sole objective of the antitrust
laws accept it as a major premise. Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 377, 381 (1965). The following analysis does not require that consumer satisfaction
be accepted as the sole premise.
77 See J. ScoTr & E. RocaxruLRr, ANTITRUSr AND TRADE REGULATION TODAY: 1967, at
52 (1967); Means, Interlocking Directorates, 8 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 148 (1932).
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has still decided that, on balance, the individual in question is the
best available.
This is not to say that the consumer's choice may never be re-
stricted. Intervention in the market may be warranted if its operation
is so imperfect that the consumers of talent persistently make mistakes
about who are the best men available. Intervention may also be ad-
visable if the decisions of the consumers, while correct from their
point of view, have serious adverse consequences for the operation of
other markets or the system as a whole.78 Nevertheless, the choices of
the buyers of executive talent are entitled, by the premises of the anti-
trust laws themselves, to presumptive validity, and the burden lies
on those who would intervene.
C. Two Reasons for Intervening: Equality of Opportunity and
the Fear of an Elite
Wilson's message to Congress stressed that a ban on interlocks
would revivify American business by introducing new leadership and
new energy. The men who would then rise to the top were not second-
rate; they were "men who have been obliged to serve when their abil-
ities entitled them to direct." This was a direct assault on the major
justification for interlocks, a denial that interlocking relationships were
necessary to enable corporations to get the best men. In the words of
the House report accompanying the Clayton bill: "The idea that there
are only a few men in any of our great corporations and industries
who are capable of handling the affairs of the same is contrary to the
spirit of our institutions. . . ."7 This theme has persisted; the Staff
Report echoes it in its worry about the debasement of management
and the construction of the management pool. 0 The report justifies
intervention in the market by asserting that the consumers of talent
fail to choose the best available by ignoring men of equivalent talent
with more time to devote to the corporation's business.
As noted earlier, this line of analysis reduces the interlock prob-
lem to a question of simple arithmetic. Regardless of the relationship
between the linked corporations, any holding of two positions by one
man restricts opportunity. Pressed to its limit, this theory would call
for the outlawing of all interlocks, not merely horizontal interlocks
between competitors and vertical interlocks between customers and
78 R. DOprmAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 140-46 (1967).
79 H.R. RE. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914).
80 STArP REPORT 225.
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suppliers. Short of this, the theory affords no readily apparent stop-
ping point. But a ban on all interlocks would be the most drastic re-
striction on the free choice of the buyers of executive talent that could
emerge from an attempt to deal with the interlock problem. One might
concede that the consumers of talent often make errors in selecting
executives and that a number of gifted men languish in the ranks, but
it does not follow that the decisions of the buying corporations are so
chronically wrong that a wholesale prohibition on interlocks is re-
quired. Further, if one agrees, that leadership ability is much more
widely distributed than the advocates of interlocks contend, one need
not argue that it is so evenly distributed that an absolute ban on
all interlocks would not lower the level of ability of directors.
Fundamentally, I think, the argument that the talent market con-
tains serious imperfections rests on the idea that celebrities and other
notables are likely to be chosen for managerial posts although anon-
ymous persons with equal or greater ability go unselected. In other
words, the market operates imperfectly because the buyers of talent
have incomplete or inadequate information."' Since a decision must
nevertheless be made, those who must decide cast about for a substi-
tute for the information they do not have. An individual's high-level
position in another firm is some indication that he has the qualifica-
tions to serve elsewhere in. a similar capacity. An absolute ban on in-
terlocks would kick that crutch out from under those leaning on it,
but unless there is some way to increase simultaneously the informa-
tion available to the consumers of talent-and obviously a ban on
interlocks would not by itself accomplish this-it seems probable that
other, less rational substitutes for information would be used. Instead
of managers in other companies, they might well draw on men within
the firm, retired generals, good fellows with the right old school tie,
and so forth. Certainly one would expect that those selected would
share the same general outlook as those making the selection.82 It is
improbable that there would be a significant increase in social mobil-
lity.83
81 Attempts are being made to construct behavior theories postulating such condi-
tions. See J. McGulm, THEoRiEs oF BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 180-81, 251-52 (1964).
82 In Gilman v. Jack, 148 Me. 171, 91 A.2d 207 (1952), the court was confronted with
a director who' had been supported by certain banking interests because his views and
those of the bankers on financial matters corresponded. The court held that a mere iden-
tity of views, leading to political support, was not enough to constitute the director the
"representative or appointee" of the bankers. A similar result would probably be reached
under § 8.
83 1 do not believe that the amount of upward mobility is inadequate. In fact, there
seems to be much more mobility now than ever before. See Warner, The Corporation
Man, in THE CORPOrATxON MAN AND MODERN SocIErY 106-15 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
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This raises a related consideration. The persistent fear of an "oli-
garchy," 84 or an "establishment,"'8 5 or a "power elite"80, often seems to
rest on similar grounds. Undoubtedly, the political influence is un-
evenly distributed in the United States. But at the present time there
is no solid evidence of the existence of a single "ruling elite" in the
sense of a "unified minority whose choices on matters of government
policies, rules, and decisions regularly prevail over the choices of other
groups . . . in the system."87 Nevertheless, among the disadvantaged
who know only that their choices are not prevailing or that they lack
influence, the line between a "ruling elite" and uneven distribution
of influence may seem academic and easily crossed. To them, a cor-
porate interlock may be the visible evidence of unjustifiable inequality
in influence and status. A ban on interlocks may result in a more egal-
itarian distribution of high-level corporate positions.
Here again interlocks are merely symptomatic of underlying so-
cial inequalities, and an absolute ban on interlocks seems unlikely to
increase significantly the opportunity for influence for those whose
social status now excludes them. It would be a radical change for the
antitrust laws to adopt this sort of egalitarian objective,88 one which
might be expected to increase the likelihood of conflicts among anti-
trust goals, since the demands of the market might well clash with an
objective of equality.89 Finally, an egalitarian objective, like the re-
striction-of-opportunity theory, affords no stopping place short of an
absolute ban on all interlocks-the most drastic intervention into the
executive-talent market possible.
It would seem, therefore, that if there is to be intervention into
the executive-talent market, it must be assumed that the buying firms
know their own interests best, but certain interlocks may have an adverse
impact on competition. This approach allows less intervention into the
market because it bans interlocks only when the corporations involved
are so related to one another that the possibility of lessening compe-
84 Brandeis used this term, as well as "Money Trust," throughout OTHER PEOPLE'S
MONEY (1914).
85 E.g., TiH BUsiINPSs ESTABLisHIMENT (E. Cheit ed. 1964).
86 C. MiLLs, THE PowER ELrTE (1956).
87 R. DAHL, MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS 15-16, 34 (1963).
88 There has been the related objective of preserving small business, always an ele-
ment of antitrust ideology. It would be ironic to adopt a radical philosophy now when
even distrust of big business seems to be weakening. See Hofstadter, What Happened to
the Antitrust Movement?, in BUsINrss EsTABLISIIMENT 113, 130-33 (E. Cheit ed. 1964).
89 It might also be argued that it is ultimately futile to go after an "elite." People
who believe in a ruling elite are unlikely to be mollified by any success; another con-
spiracy will always lurk behind whatever is destroyed. Cf. Dahl, A Critique of the Ruling
Elite Model, 52 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 463 (1958).
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tition is created. It should be noted, however, that the byproducts of
banning interlocks are some opening of opportunities and some equal-
ization in the distribution of influence. It is not suggested that these
objectives have no value, but they cannot be pursued directly. In close
cases involving interlocks that may threaten competition, these objec-
tives may still be used to tip the scales in favor of prohibition.
D. Interlocks Effecting Common Control
Although much of the discussion about interlocks seems to as-
sume that the major threat to competition posed by them is the bring-
ing under common control of two ostensibly independent corporations,
section 8 and the Celler bill apply with equal force whether two cor-
porations share one director, have a complete identity of boards, or
share some intermediate number of directors. But sharing one director
does not necessarily indicate that two corporations are under common
control9 0 If, however, the majority of each board is the same or, a
fortiori, if there is a complete identity among the boards, it is apparent
that the companies are under unified control. Where this has occurred,
the preservation of separate corporate forms should not be permitted
to disguise the consolidation.91 If this centralization of control has re-
sulted from one corporation's owning stock in the other, section 7 of
the Clayton Act92 seems to cover the situation, and the standards that
are being formulated under that section could be applied.98 If section
7 is inapplicable, sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are fully ade-
quate to treat this "combination." 94 It is by no means certain that the
standards under the Sherman Act are looser than those presently be-
90J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 106 (1959). It is, of course, theoretically possible
for common control to be effected through a single shared director if the board of one of
the corporations allows him to make all policy. But it is necessary to ask why a board
would do this; ordinarily one would think that directors would guard their prerogatives
jealously. One situation in which the board might allow the shared director to decide is
presented by the director who is representing some outside power base. An outside power
base would probably use some other method for exerting control. Moreover, going after an
interlock presupposes that nothing will be done to neutralize the power itself.
91 The "intra-enterprise" conspiracy doctrine has sometimes been thought of as re-
quiring separate corporations within the same enterprise to be treated as if they are en-
tirely separate firms. Properly conceived, the cases believed to support that doctrine do
not call for this result. See Comment, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman
Act, 63 YAI. L.J. 372 (1954).
92 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
98 E.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US.
271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
94 United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964); United States v.




ing employed under section 7, but, in any case, the policy of section
7 is relevant in deciding a Sherman Act case.95
Since the ban on interlocks has not been limited to cases in which
consolidation of control resulted and since a separate rule for inter-
locks might well be superfluous in such cases, it is necessary to ask
why we should ban interlocks that are not so extensive as to result
automatically in consolidation of control. The remainder of this article
will treat those cases; it will assume that the control groups within
the linked corporations are entirely separate and that a given indi-
vidual holds a managerial position in two corporations because the
control group in each corporation has deemed this to be in the best
interests of the enterprise.96
Under what circumstances, then, would a control group deem
it in the enterprise's interest to have as a manager a person perform-
ing managerial functions in another corporation? Two broad cate-
gories may be discerned. First, the control group may decide, without
any external pressure being applied, that the particular individual
is more likely than anyone else to benefit the enterprise. Secondly,
the appointee may be the representative of an external power that
the control group is unable to resist regardless of its personal prefer-
ences; capitulation may appear to be in the best interests of the en-
terprise because of the external power's ability to employ sanctions
against the enterprise by inflicting some injury or withholding some
boon.97
E. Horizontal Interlocks
From an antitrust standpoint, interlocking relations between com-
peting corporations have been of the most concern. If competing corpo-
rations share one or more directors, the arrangement is apparently
per se unlawful under section 8, but prior to the first judicial con-
struction of that section, considerable doubt existed whether the stat-
utory language would permit a construction of per se illegality. The
95 Compare United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), with United
States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
96 See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507 n.7 (1948).
97 It will be assumed throughout that there is an identity of interest between the
control group and the enterprise. In practice, however, a control group may be willing to
compromise the best interests of the enterprise if it, or any of its members stands to gain
thereby and the compromise is unlikely to be detected. For this reason, Brandeis criticized
the rule making contracts between interlocked corporations voidable instead of void. See
BRANDEIS 58-59. At this preliminary stage, it would seem unwise to complicate the analysis
by the introduction of a variable about which our theory cannot generalize. Accordingly,
this article assumes that problems of conflict of interest can best be handled through
mechanisms other than the antitrust laws.
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difficulty centered on the requirement that the interlocked corpora-
tions "are or shall have been theretofore, by virtue of their business
and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of com-
petition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of
any of the antitrust laws." If the agreement hypothesized were a price-
fixing or market-sharing agreement, the section would have the same
effect as if it had ended with the word "competitors." This would
render the remainder of the section meaningless and violate the tra-
ditional canon that all words of a statute are to be given meaning if
possible. 98 If, however, the word "agreement" were taken as meaning
a iherger agreement, this could be avoided.99 In the Sears, Roebuck
case Judge Weinfeld rejected this line of analysis and granted the Gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment. He decided that construing
."agreement" to include a price-fixing or territorial division was more
consistent with the unqualified language of the section and employed
an ingenious constitutional argument to avoid the redundancy. 00
Even if section 8 were not being reconsidered, Judge Weinfeld's
ruling could hardly be taken as having settled the issue. The opinion
of one district judge, even so eminent a judge as Judge Weinfeld, sel-
dom makes antitrust law. The argument for prohibiting competing
corporations from sharing even one director is that the interlock per-
mits the coordination of policies between nominally independent firms
-to an extent that competition between them may be completely elim-
inated.' Indeed, if a director, for example, is to be faithful to both
corporations, some accommodation must result. Suppose X is a direc-
tor of both Corporation A and Corporation B. X could hardly vote
for a policy by A that would injure B without violating his duty of
loyalty to B; at the same time he could hardly abstain from voting
without depriving A of his best judgment. If the firms really do com-
-9 0As noted, if the capitulation is sufficiently complete, common control may theo-
retically result here.
99 Kramer, supra note 5, at 1268-70.
100 This was essentially defendant's argument in United States v. Sears, Roebuck &
,Co., 11 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Recent developments in merger law make such a
dichotomy meaningless today. Nevertheless, there is room for arguing that the "agreement"
hypothesized should not be a naked agreement not to compete, but an agreement not to
compete that is ancillary to an integration. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and
the Per Se Concept: Price ixing and Market Division, 74 YArE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE
L.J. 373 (1966).
101Judge Weinfeld argued that the "so that" clause eliminated a constitutional
difficulty that might have arisen had it been absent. If the statute had ended with the
word "competitors," it would literally forbid an interlock between two corporations that
competel and were in interstate commerce, even if their competition were solely in
intrastate commerce. But the "so tat" clause requires that the corporations compete in
interstate commerce. 111 F. Supp. at 617. This may seem like a hypertechnical argument;
I prefer to think of it as an appropriate response to a hypertechnical argument.
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pete-in the sense of vying for economic advantage at the expense of
the other-there can hardly be any reason for an interlock between
competitors other than the suppression of competition 0 2
If an interlock among competitors is being used to suppress com-
petition among them, it would seem that some antecedent agreement
not to compete must have been reached. The control group of Cor-
poration A would hardly accept on its board a director of Corporation
B unless the A group had already decided not to compete with B.
Similarly, the control group of B would hardly permit one of its di-
rectors so to serve unless it had reached a like decision.0 3 Finally,
there must have been some communication of those decisions between
the firms. Although one of the firms may have taken the initiative, it
is doubtful that its competitors were coerced into accepting an inter-
lock. Only when one firm is so clearly dominant that its competitors
might fear its retaliatory powers would there be the possibility of suf-
ficient external force being applied to induce another control group
to capitulate. But if one firm had such dominance, the fear of retalia-
tion would ordinarily be enough to chill the efforts of its rivals with-
out resorting to an interlock.0 4
The underlying agreement may vary in complexity from case to
case. In some instances it may be necessary for the firms to negotiate
a full-fledged cartel arrangement in order to reduce competitive vigor
to an acceptable level.10 5 In other cases each firm may believe that
rational oligopolistic behavior may be relied upon to achieve the de-
sired results as soon as certain obstacles are removed, and that inter-
locking relationships will remove those obstacles. 1' 6 Nothing else need
be prearranged. It seems clear, however, that an agreement on a plan
to facilitate oligopolistic pricing is as illegal as a more complicated
cartel arrangement. 0 7 The formal embodiment of the arrangement,
102 J. BAIN, supra note 90, at 107; Means, supra note 77.
103 Competitors may have legitimate interests in engaging in collaborative efforts that
do not necessarily involve a diminution of competition. Coordination of credit facilities
or quality standardization are examples. Nonetheless, it seems that these objectives can be
achieved by means other than the sharing of high-level decision-makers.
104 In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), the
Court struck down defendants' Open Competition plan, largely on the ground that genuine
competitors would not give their rivals access to detailed information about their internal
affairs. The Court reasoned that the very existence of an agreement to exchange such in-
formation warranted the inference that defendants had agreed not to compete.
105 See Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, in READINGS IN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 176, 179-81 (Heflebower & Stocking eds. 1958);
E. SINGER, ANTITsr ECONOMICS 91-94 (1968).
106 A concise statement of the conditions under which cartelization is likely may be,
found in McGee, Ocean Freight Rate Conferences and the American Merchant Marine, 27
U. CHI. L. REv. 191, 197-204 (1960).
107 See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Sugar Institute, Inc. v.
United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
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of course, is not an indispensable element of the definition of an agree-
ment proscribed by the Sherman Act.108 Although the problem of
proof may vary, the underlying agreement is in all cases illegal per se
under the Sherman Act. Section 8 merely applies a similar per se rule
to the mode of enforcing the agreement. The issue, then, is whether
this separate per se rule is necessary or desirable.
An interlocking directorate is but one mode of enforcing a col-
lusive agreement among ostensible competitors. Telephone calls, trade
association meetings, business lunches, as well as the more titillating
techniques of secret hotel meetings and elaborate codes, are all avail-
able as alternatives. 0 9 The interlocking directorate device is markedly
inferior to the other possibilities in one respect: It is comparatively
obvious. Information on persons serving as high-level officers or di-
rectors of our larger corporations and extensive disclosure is required
by law; the application of modern data-retrieval techniques can re-
veal every major interlock. Why then should one method of imple-
menting collusion be singled out for per se treatment, especially when
other techniques are apparently superior? If the interlock is outlawed,
will not the collusively-inclined turn to these?
Perhaps an answer is suggested by another question: If the inter-
lock device is so flawed, why should it ever be used? The answer may
be that each signatory of a price-fixing or similar agreement is under
a tremendous temptation to "chisel" on his fellow signatories by low-
ering his price, This centrifugal force can quickly shatter the cartel
unless each member knows that any chiseling on his part will be
quickly detected and that he can trust his fellow members not to
chisel-if for no nobler reason than they know that their chiseling will
be detected.110 For these conditions to be met the cartel managers or
the other firms must have access to adequate information about the
operations of each member.". In many cases market transactions are
made under conditions making sufficient information available, but
in other cases it may be necessary to enforce the arrangement by a
technique which guarantees that no firm will be able to keep its op-
erations secret. If, for example, the industry faces large, powerful buy-
ers who are able to extract price concessions or enforce a system of
108 See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HAsv. L. REv. 655 (1962).
109 See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
110 J. BAIN, supra note 90, at 107.
111 See D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 18-19 (1959).
[Vol. 46:819
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
sealed bids, the news that one member has broken the front may not
reach the others through normal channels until well after the trans-
action. 112 A system whereby each agrees to supply information on his
prospective bid is obviously subject to the same infirmity as the bare
cartel agreement, depending as it does on each member's keeping the
faith." 8 But if one member of the board may be counted on to broad-
cast each operation to other members of the cartel, the temptation to
cheat is kept to a minimum.
This presupposes that the board, if the interlock is of directors,
is making the decisions in question, or at least has access to informa-
tion about the decisions in advance of their becoming operationalized.
If this is not a foregone conclusion, it may be necessary to include this
point in the agreement. Of course, it may still be possible to work
around the common director, but it would be much more difficult. 4
If the preceding analysis is correct, the following conclusions seem
warranted. First, a direct interlock between competitors would not
occur in the absence of an agreement not to compete, which is itself
illegal per se. The real objective is that underlying agreement; on
this, the law is clear. But the very clarity of the law has increased the
evidentiary problems of establishing the existence of the agreement.
Because the interlocking directorate device must operate on the sur-
face, it is unlikely to be employed if there is a less overt technique
for assuring the members of the cartel the necessary information about
the operations of each signatory firm. Prohibiting the interlock itself
would cut off each firm from information about the others and en-
courage the cartel to crumble through its inherent instability. As to
this class of cartels, the need for proving the existence of an agreement
would be eliminated, and establishing the existence of the interlock
would be fairly easy.
Therefore, although the direct interlock between competitors is
only an enforcement mechanism, there is good reason for applying
a per se rule to it as well as to the agreement it implements. In the
first place, the interlock seems intended solely to suppress competition.
No legitimate reason for the sharing of directors by competitors ap-
112 In the electrical equipment cases, it seems that internal pressures to perform had
combined with the system of sealed bids to cause periodic breakdowns in the cartel. See
generally J. FULLER, THE GENTLEMEN CONSPIRATORS (1962); R. Smrrn, COPOaATIONS IN
CIsis 118-66 (Anchor ed. 1966); C. NVALTON & F. CLEVELAND, COPORATIONS ON TRIAL:
THE ELEanuc CAsFs (1964).
113 E.g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 558 (1986).
114 Indeed, the very effort to work around him might arouse his suspicions unless
elaborate schemes were devised and implemented.
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pears. The vague defense that the individual is "the best man" prompts
the further question: Why is he the best man? Certainly a ban on
interlocks among competitors would be a comparatively slight restric-
tion in the firm's choice of directors. All the executives and directors
of noncompeting firms remain available. It may be said that an in-
dividual's job with competing firms has given him a specialized ex-
pertise in that industry. But surely the firm could turn to its own
personnel for the necessary knowledge. Moreover, most believe the
function of the outside director is to supply breadth of view to counter-
balance the inside directors' expertise. 115 No legitimate purpose is ap-
parent. The interlock is easily definable and lends itself to summary
treatment. If it is vital to the continued existence of the agreement,
prohibiting it will, without more, lead to salutary effects.
Two qualifications may be urged to this rule. It may be argued
that the Government should be required to prove that the corporations
sharing a common director control a significant percentage of the rele-
vant market. It may also be contended that the per se rule should admit
a de minimis exception. Requiring the Government to prove that the
linked corporations control a specified percentage of the relevant mar-
ket is supported by logic and precedent. First, a cartel arrangement will
be effective only if a sufficient percentage of the relevant market is
brought under control to give the members of the cartel some market
power. If the interlocked corporations do not have a sufficient portion
of the market, the interlock can cause little harm, whatever the parties
may have intended." 6 Furthermore, in all the leading price-fixing cases,
with the exception of Kiefer-Stewart,17 the defendants did control a
commanding share of the relevant market;" 8 hence, this requirement
may be deemed a necessary element of the Government's case in price-
fixing cases and a qualification on the per se rule applicable thereto.
Nonetheless, I believe that it would be preferable not to impose a
similar requirement for interlocks among competitors. In the first
place, it is often very difficult to determine just what the relevant
market is;" 9 some commentators now feel that a disproportionate
115 See Weinberg, A Corporation Director Looks at His Job, 27 HARv. Bus. REv.
585 (1949).
116 See R. CAVEs, AMERIcAN INDusTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCr, PERFORMANCE 42-43 (2d
ed. 1967).
117 Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
118 E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
119 Compare United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), with United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US. 271 (1964).
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amount of time and energy has been devoted to making this determina-
tion, time and energy which might be better spent inquiring into the
effects of the challenged arrangement.
20
Furthermore, if the market could be defined with precision, there
would still be a question of how much must be controlled before un-
desirable effects show up.121 It would be worthwhile making these
inquiries only if interlocks could produce so many beneficial results
that we would hesitate to outlaw them in gross. So far as interlocks
between competitors are concerned, few benefits should be expected.
Only the presumption against restricting the buyers' free choice re-
mains, and it would not seem strong enough to justify complicating
every horizontal interlock case.
The de minimis exception involves similar considerations. Two
corporations may account for so small a percentage of the relevant
market that a threat to competition stemming from an interlock be-
tween them is inconceivable. The above discussion of market per-
centages seems to cover the de minimis exception in this sense. But a
de minimis exception may mean something else. Two large, diversified
firms may make competing products, but those products may account
for so small a portion of each firm's sales that it is unlikely that they
would bother establishing an interlock simply to control the market in
that product. This argument was raised, but rejected on the facts, in
Sears, Roebuck.122 It seems to have prevailed, however, in Paramount
Pictures Corporation v. Baldwin-Montrose Chemical Company,123 in
which two directors of Paramount were challenged by an opposition
faction within the Paramount management. One of the challenged
directors was also a director of General Artists Corporation, a talent
agency, which had an ownership interest in one television program and,
to that extent, competed with Paramount for the television market.
The other director was a director of Baldwin-Montrose and Feuer &
Martin Productions, Incorporated, a producer of musical comedies on
Broadway, which received royalties from phonograph records made
from shows it produced and, to that extent, competed with Paramount
in the phonograph records market. The case is an appealing one for a
de minimis exception since the firms joined to Paramount accounted
for a miniscule portion of the markets in which they confronted Para-
120 Low, Introduction, in EcoNomICS oF ANTrRuST 1, 18 (D. Low ed. 1968).
121 For a discussion of monopoly indices see E. SINGER, supra note 105, at 63-72.
122 United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
123 1966 Trade Cas. 71,678 (S.D.N.Y.).
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mount and received only a small part of their revenues from those
markets.
In cases such as Paramount a court is likely to go to great lengths
to avoid holding the interlock illegal. If a de minimis exception were
to be definitely rejected, a court would probably hold that the linked
firms were not "competitors", in any meaningful sense of the word. The
issue is which approach is preferable. An explicit de minimis exception
has the advantage of permitting the courts a greater degree of candor
and is more likely to produce consistent doctrine. But a de minimis
exception is as vague as a requirement that the Government establish
that the defendants account for a significant portion of the relevant
market. This would complicate a significant number of cases. Also, it
would not be as effective a prophylaxis as a ban on horizontal interlocks
without exception. These factors suggest that no explicit de minimis
exception should be recognized even at the cost of some doctrinal
untidiness.
The proposed amendment would extend the ban of section 8 to
interlocks of any "director, officer, or employee with managerial func-
tions." It thus supplements a formal test with a functional one. Once it
is established that interlocking directorates between competitors should
be illegal per se, such an extension is a logical step; the sharing of a
president or a vice-president or, in general, sharing decision-making
personnel is as good a way of exchanging information as the sharing of
a director. One can certainly sympathize with the government lawyers
who sought to purge the board of General Steel Castings Company of
those who also served the board of a competing corporation only to be
confronted with mass resignations of the common directors whose
places were then taken by officers of General's competitors.12 4 This and
similar cases dramatize the need to extend section 8's prohibition to
officers, and the extension could be made without sacrificing the ad-
ministrative convenience of a per se rule. Also, information about high-
level officers is widely disseminated, and detection would be compara-
tively simple.
Some objection may be made to the extension of section 8 to
"employees with managerial functions." First, information about em-
ployees below the top echelon is less widely circulated, making detection
of interlocks more difficult. Secondly, the shift from a formal to a
functional test would allow the defendant to question whether, as a
matter of fact, the interlocked employee performed a managerial func-
124 The incident is recounted in FTC R.sORT, supra note 7, at 14 n.16.
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tion. This would entail an inquiry into the internal organization of the
corporations involved and might well bog down the Government in
evidentiary problems similar to those involved in proving that a cartel
exists. The major value of a special per se rule for interlocks would be
compromised. Finally, if the individual is being used as a conduit for
information and not for active coordination of policies, it is not neces-
sary that he have any "managerial functions" so long as he has access to
the information. He would thus not be covered by the extension.
Although these points have some force, they do not provide a
complete answer. To be sure, proving that a particular employee has
managerial functions may create evidentiary problems for the Govern-
ment. Yet failing to include a functional test would afford a means of
easy evasion for any firm willing to shoulder the burden of thinking
up a title that would not be covered by any reasonable construction of
"officers."' 25 Moreover, one may seriously doubt that the difficulty of
proving what functions an individual performs approaches the difficulty
of proving the market effects of a single firm's behavior or a collusive
arrangement, because the latter issue requires the hypothesizing of
what would have happened if events had been other than they were;
proving that an individual has managerial functions does not require a
similar excursion into the hypothetical.ne
One may brush aside any contentions based on the idea that some
violations will go undetected or that some nonmanager may serve as a
conduit. If this is true, it is no argument against a per se rule for those
cases that are covered and are detected. 27 But the objection that the
person used as a conduit need only have access to the necessary infor-
125 Corporation statutes often prescribe that a corporation shall have certain officers,
such as a president or secretary. To the extent that the word "officers" is thought to refer to
a set of positions roughly defined by such statutes, some functional supplement is necessary.
Of course, "officers" could be defined to include not only holders of certain positions
but also all those having certain defined functions. It would seem better, however, not to
leave it to the courts to work out this definition. In United States v. Newmont Mining Co.,
1964 Trade Cas. 71,030 (S.D.N.Y.), one of the individual defendants withdrew from
Newmont's board to serve in what the court termed the "rather ill-defined capacity of
financial advisor to the corporation." Id. at 79,081.
120 This is, of course, only one reason why proving what functions an individual
performs is immensely easier than proving what effects an arrangement will have. For a
good survey of the other difficulties, see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merg-
ing of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 238-49 (1960).
127 Cf. Turner, supra note 69:
[]t is by no means necessary that the practice subjected to a per se rule be
readily identifiable in all cases. Borderline situations are inevitable. It may often
be difficult to identify "price-fixing," as the trade-association cases make manifest.
Yet this does not destroy the obvious utility and propriety of the rule that price-
fixing is illegal per se. There are obvious kinds of price-fixing; there is no reason
for the courts to waste their time over them just because less obvious forms re-




mation and need not have managerial functions rests on a more sub-
stantial basis., The objection suggests that the amendment is based on
the fallacious premise that an interlock is a device for consolidating the
operations of two firms under one control group. 28 As has been noted,
this may occur if the number of shared directors amounts to a majority,
but the graver, more prevalent threat is that the interlock may be used
as a channel of information to facilitate collusive behavior. There is
bite in this argument, but nevertheless the proposed amendment may
be the best solution. In the first place, the shared individual often
would have to have some "managerial functions" if he is to be assured
of access to the information.1 29 Moreover, it would be very difficult to
draft a statute prohibiting interlocks in those cases in which the shared
personnel had access to information that might be used to facilitate
collusive behavior. Congress might as well prohibit the sharing of per-
sonnel of any kind by competitors. Some may consider this the best
answer, but the sharing of, say, a credit manager might serve legitimate
functions, and, in such a case, it might be best to allow for judicial
development of the rules under the Sherman or FTC Acts.
Thus far, we have considered only direct interlocks among com-
petitors. The enforcement agencies have urged a ban on indirect inter-
locks as well, 18 and an indirect interlock might also serve as a conduit
for transmitting information among competitors. The Staff Report gives
three examples of indirect interlocks: (1) Corporations A and B (as-
sumed throughout to be competitors) each have a director on the board
of Corporation X, a noncompetitor. (2) Corporation X, a noncompeti-
tor, has different representatives on the boards of Corporations A and
B. (3) Corporation A shares a director with Corporation X, a noncom-
petitor, which in turn shares a director with Corporation Y, which
c6mpetes with neither A nor X. Y then shares a director with Corpora-
tion B.131 Case (1) and Case (2) are structurally identical, differing
only as to the corporation to which the shared directors owe their pri-
mary allegiance. In Case (1) the directors owe their primary allegiance
to A and B; in Case (2) they owe it to X. This makes a good deal of
practical difference since, if the directors consider themselves primar-
ily directors of A and B with the task of promoting the interests of
128 J.,BAIN, supra note 90, at 106-07.
1
2
9 For example, it should be much easier to "work around" an employee without
managerial functions; other things being equal, the more highly placed the common
individuals are, the more likely it is that they will get the information they seek.
180 A major point made by the FTC Report seems to have been the prevalence of
indirect interlocks. FTC REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-36.
131 STAF REPoar 10.
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those corporations, the interlock through X becomes merely a com-
plicated reporting system, depending on the willingness of each firm
to supply, through its representative on X, accurate reports of the
firm's operations. Being no better than a conventional reporting sys-
tem, it is doubtful whether an indirect interlock would be used for
such a purpose.
On the other hand, in Case (2) the representative on the boards of
A and B consider themselves primarily agents of X. This kind of ar-
rangement will be more trustworthy than a reporting system whenever
Corporation X is intended to be the instrument for the suppression of
competition within the industry of which Corporations A and B are
members. But this presupposes that Corporation X stands to profit by
the suppression of competition in the A-B industry because otherwise
it would not bother becoming involved. Corporation X may be in the
cartel management business, profiting through the sale of management
services, or it may be in a straightforward enterprise that somehow
stands to profit from the suppression of competition. 32
Case (3) seems resolvable into either Case (1) or Case (2), depend-
ing on whether the X-Y liaison has been formed with the intent of
suppressing competition in the A-B industry. If so, it may function
essentially as Case (2). On the other hand, it may be a more complicated
version of Case (1). The A-X director must report fully and accurately
to the X-Y director who relays the news to the B-Y director. Since the
primary allegiance of the A-X director is to A and that of the B-Y
director is to B, the arrangement is essentially a reporting system. As
noted in connection with Case (1), use of interlocks for this purpose
seems unlikely.
The crucial issue then becomes: Under what circumstances would
a firm "outside" a particular industry find it sufficiently profitable to
suppress competition within the industry to become the instrument of
that suppression? Apart from the case in which the "outside" firm en-
gages in cartel management, it is difficult to describe these circum-
stances with any exactitude. One may imagine cases in which the firm is
"outside" the industry only because its operations are entirely con-
132 An example of the latter situation may be afforded by the position of the invest-
ment bankers at the turn of the century. Their continued success in underwriting securities
depended on the profitability of securities previously underwritten. Many of the industries
in which the bankers underwrote securities had serious excess capacity because of a gross
overestimation of the potential market; the cutthroat competition thus threatened could
cause losses to many security holders. By using their good offices to prevent this competi-
tion, the investment bankers guaranteed more satisfaction with the securities, and more
business for themselves. T. COCHRAN & W. MILL..R, supra note 29, at 188.
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ducted in a geographically different area from that in which the opera-
tions of A and B are conducted. 83 If excess capacity exists in the A-B
area, there may be temptations to transship into X's area if competition
is not controlled. 134 Similarly, although X's product is substantially
different from the product of the A-B industry, it may feel the effects of
competition within that industry.135 One may suspect, however, that
the cases are extremely rare in which the impact on X is so substantial
that X will wish to suppress competition in the A-B industry, and that
when they occur, they indicate that, for all practical purposes, X is in
the same industry as A and B and it was a mistake to exclude it. One
may also imagine a case in which X is a supplier or customer of the
A-B industry. Ordinarily, X would prefer as much competition as pos-
sible in an industry with which it deals, since it thus would be helped
in driving a more profitable bargain.13 6 It may be, however, that con-
ditions in the A-B industry are such that vigorous competition could
lead to an unpredictable course of events, and that X might consider
it more profitable to forego the advantages it would receive from com-
petition in order to impose stability sufficient to make rational plan-
ning possible. 13'
In any case, the proposed amendment of section 8 does not deal
with these supposititious indirect interlocks except to the extent that
the ban on vertical interlocks or interlocks among "potential" com-
petitors will cover indirect horizontal interlocks as well. This excludes,
for example, the case in which X's product is sufficiently different from
that of A and B to be classified in a separate industry even though a
substantial cross-elasticity of demand exists between them. Although
133 Under such circumstances, a rise in the price level in either market to the point
that an "outside" firm could incur the extra costs of transportation and still make a profit
would encourage entry. If transportation costs are very low, the markets are not too
distinct. In any case, firms in one area might have to price with an eye on "outside" firms
lest entry be encouraged.
134 An example of this phenomenon is the "bootlegging" of automobiles from one area
of the country to another. See Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the
Sherman Act, 75 HAxv. L. Rv. 795, 820 (1962).
135 This difficulty in delineating boundaries between industries because of the frequent
absence of any sharp difference in the impact exerted on the price of a product by im-
perfect substitutes within an industry and imperfect substitutes produced by other in-
dustries has long been noted in the literature. See, e.g., J. BmN, PRIcE THEORY 23-27 (rev.
ed. 1952). The issue has also bedeviled the courts. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 851 U.S. 877 (1956).
136 See J. BAN, supra note 90, at 332-33.
137 In Professor Galbraith's view, the market is too unreliable to serve as a substitute
for rational planning; accordingly firms often take whatever steps are necessary to insure
that their calculations will not be upset by extraneous factors, like consumer tastes. See
J. GALBRArrH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 16, 22-34 (1967).
[Vol. 46:819
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT
some commentators believe that this should be illegal, prohibiting all
"indirect" interlocks seems an unnecessary intrusion into the market.18s
In sum, the preceding analysis suggests the following conclusions
regarding horizontal interlocks: (1) the present per se rule is justified
and should be retained; (2) the proposal to expand section 8 to cover
interlocking officers and employees with managerial functions, though
subject to some criticism, is sound; and (3) indirect interlocks may be
used to suppress competition, but the situations in which this is likely
to occur appear few and the interlocks themselves do not indicate
whether they are being so used. Accordingly, a complicated inquiry
into the market effects of the interlocks may be necessary, thus under-
mining the automatic approach of a per se rule. These interlocks do
not represent a serious enough problem to be an independent reason
for expanding section 8.
F. Vertical Interlocks
Interlocks between suppliers and customers raise a separate set of
issues. In the first place, these interlocks are ordinarily motivated by a
desire on the part of the firms to facilitate transactions between them-
selves. These transactions may flow entirely in one direction, as in the
case of a manufacturer joined to a distributor, or mutually advanta-
geous reciprocal dealings may be anticipated, as in the case of a bank
seeking depositors sharing a director with a commercial firm seeking a
source of credit and contacts. 139 The very existence of an interlock
suggests that the firms intend to deal with one another to a greater
extent than they would absent the interlock. This tendency has been
described as "favoritism" by those hostile to interlocks. 140 Analytically,
however, it appears to be merely a form of vertical integration1 41 pre-
senting several familiar antitrust questions in an unfamiliar guise.
The proposed amendments to section 8 would establish a more
stringent rule for vertical integration through interlock than is pres-
ently applied to vertical integration achieved by other means. Vertical
integration through asset or stock ownership is made illegal under
section 7 of the Clayton Act only when the effect of this integration
138 If the Celler bill were to be passed in its proposed form, its ban on vertical
interlocks would also reach many indirect interlocks.
139 See Means, supra note 77, at 148-49.
140 E.g., BWAWmEs 51.
141 See Means, supra note 77, at 150. A thorough discussion of the various forms of
vertical integration is Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration,
69 YAr. LJ. 1 (1959).
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"may be substantially to, lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly." 142 Vertical integration through requirements contracts or
exclusive-dealing arrangements is covered by section 3 of the Clayton
Act, which embodies the identical test.
148
The legal status of vertical integration under either section 7 or
section 8 is far from clear. In Du Pont-GM144 the Supreme Court held
that Du Pont's holding of twenty-three percent of General Motors'
stock would "tend to create a monopoly" in the automotive fabrics and
finishes markets. Since GM accounted for half the automobile industry's
sales, the Court assumed that it was half the purchasing market as
well.145 The case was widely deemed sui generis since the Court was
unlikely to be confronted with the integration of two such colossal
firms again; 46 but soon after, the Court invalidated a merger of the
Brown Shoe Company, a shoe manufacturer, and G. R. Kinney Com-
pany, a shoe retailer. 47 Neither firm had a commanding share of the
relevant market at its level, but the Court found a threat to competition
stemming from the vertical aspect of the merger. The Court's analysis
in these cases and its treatment of later horizontal and conglomerate
mergers 48 leave open the possibility that something like a per se rule
may emerge. The Court has indicated before that vertical integration
was illegal per se,' 49 but has withdrawn from that position in later
cases.'5 0
The treatment of exclusive-dealing contracts has had a similarly
checkered career. In the Standard Stations'5' case the Supreme Court
opted for a fairly automatic test: Exclusive-dealing contracts foreclosing
a substantial percentage of the relevant market would be held illegal
without further sifting of evidence. 52 Once again, however, the Court
pulled back in a later case, suggesting that a thorough examination of
all relevant data would be undertaken. 158 In part this change of posi-
tion may have been a response to the anguished outcry produced by
Standard Stations on the part of academics who found its test too
142 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964)
143 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
144 United States'v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 853 US. 586 (1957).
145 Id. at 596
146 See M. HANDLER, ANTIRUST IN PERSPECTIVE 49 (1957).
147 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294 (1962).
148 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 US. 568 (1967).
149 See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 224-27 (1947).
150 E.g., United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 US. 495, 519-26 (1948).
p151 Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
152 Id. at 313-14.
'53 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 US. 623 (1961).
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crude' 54 and defense counsel who found it too restrictive. 155 Of course,
the Court could always change direction again, but until it does, neither
form of vertical integration can be deemed illegal per se.
The proposed amendment requires a legislative judgment that
vertical integration by interlock merits per se treatment although
neither Congress nor the courts have meted out this treatment to ver-
tical integration in any other form. This step may be warranted if
Congress can determine that vertical interlocks have fewer legitimate
interests to support them or are more likely to have more objection-
able consequences than other forms of vertical integration. Even if
this cannot be established, Congress may decide that vertical interlocks
are no less objectionable than other forms of vertical integration and
that this is a good starting point for eradicating all forms.
The difficulty is that the uncertainty reflected in the vertical-
merger and exclusive-dealing cases is a reflection of the lack of solid
empirical data about the effects of those practices, the lack of a con-
ceptual framework for analyzing particular cases, and the failure to
ask basic policy questions about vertical arrangements. 156 This circum-
stance should at least suggest caution on the part of Congress and argue
against an uncompromising prohibition on all vertical interlocks while
the state of our knowledge is so rudimentary.
Congress has other options, of course. It may, for instance, enact
a statute applying the same test to vertical interlocks that now appears
in other sections of the Clayton Act. This would shift from Congress
to the courts the burden of developing the law on vertical interlocks
and would have the advantage of allowing the rules to grow and change
as our knowledge increased.
Congress must, in any case, reexamine antitrust policy towards
vertical integration, with special reference to vertical interlocks. Thus
the following discussion of vertical interlocks will assume this broader
context.
What are some of the ways in which vertical integration may be
deemed objectionable? It has been noted that the very existence of
vertical relations indicates an intention on the part of the firms to
increase the extent of their dealings with one another. It may be argued
that since this will "harm" competitors at both levels by removing one
154 E.g., Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. Ray. 913 (1952).
155 McLaren, Related Problems of "Requirements" Contracts and Acquisitions :n
Vertical Integration Under the Anti-trust Laws, 45 Il. L. Ray. 141 (1950).
155 See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under -the Clayton Act, 1961 Sup. Cr. REV. 267, 271-73.
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supplier and one customer from the market, nothing more need be
shown.157 This view has been criticized for ignoring the interests of the
integrating firms and for confusing the protection of "competitors" with
the protection of "competition," 158 and it would probably find few
supporters in its bare form.
A slight variation of the preceding argument is that vertical inte-
gration may result in cost savings to firms at both levels and thus enable
the integrated firm to lower its prices and take business from its rivals.
Since a value of the competitive system is that it encourages efficiency,
this argument seems to call for the favoring of the interests of the com-
petitors of the integrated firm over the public interest in preserving
competition whenever those interests conflict.'5" While some language
in the Brown Shoe case does suggest that the efficiencies of vertical
integration may be an affirmative reason for invalidating a vertical
merger, 160 the Court purported to find in the legislative history a
choice to preserve small competitors even at the cost of efficiency. 161 To
most commentators the legislative history showed congressional ap-
proval of both competition and small business, but no preference of
one over the other.
10 2
Congress could, of course, now decide to prefer one or the other.
In the past Congress seemingly has voted to protect small business from
more efficient larger firms.163 And although professors may find the
project unappetizing, Congress might do so in the face of overwhelm-
ing professorial opposition. Yet the widespread view that integrations
producing efficiencies are not to be discouraged on that ground alone
is a powerful argument against expanding the coverage of section 8
for that reason. Moreover, an attempt to prohibit interlocks resulting
in efficiencies would, as a practical matter, commit Congress to a pro-
hibition of all interlocks between firms standing in a vertical relation.
Few firms will enter an interlocking relation unless each firm expects
enough tangible gain from the interlock to forego its future freedom to
deal in the market.164 To the extent that the anticipated advantages
157 See Kessler k Stern, supra note 141, at 14-15.
1581d. at 42-51; Bok, supra note 156, at 293.
159 This is the thrust of the critique of certain antitrust doctrines in Bork & Bowman,
supra note 76, at 363.
160 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 870 U.S. 294, 44 (1962).
161 See also id. at 311-23 (survey of the legislative history).
162 See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L.
R v. 1313, 1326 (1965).
163 Examples of such voting are the Robinson-Patman Act, the McGuire Act, and the
Miller-Tydings Act granting an antitrust exemption to resale-price maintenance. See
generally J. PAL_ xotheeAIN, POLILTIcS oF DxsunaTrrboN (1965).
164 E. SINGER, supra note 105, at 206-11; see Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sher-
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represent significant efficiencies, the integrated firm will gain a "com-
petitive" advantage in every case in which the expectations are fulfilled.
It need not be assumed, however, that the expected efficiencies will
materialize in all cases. Even when efficiencies do not result, however,
there are good arguments for invalidating the integration. First, com-
petitors may be injured even though the interlocked firms are no more
efficient than others. More importantly, there is little reason to devote
major energies to avoid invalidating an interlock that has little in its
favor, either from the viewpoint of one or both of the firms or from
the viewpoint of the economy as a whole.
Arguably, however, the tendency of interlocked firms to deal with
one another may injure the competitive process itself since it will fore-
close competitors at both levels from dealing with the firm linked to
their rival.105 In sum, the argument is as follows: 16 Since each firm may
be assumed to be maximizing profits, it will not deal with any firm that
cannot meet the going price. If a firm commits itself for some future
period to deal with a particular supplier, it is giving up its freedom to
make the best deal possible in the market place. Accordingly, the sup-
plier must offer it some special inducement in order to tie it down. If
this inducement lies in the superiority of the supplier's product, this is
an honestly earned competitive advantage and any injury that the firm's
rivals suffer may be ascribed to it and not to the integration. On the
other hand, if the added inducement is a price reduction or the equiv-
alent, this tactic should be available to the rivals unless (1) they are
less efficient and thus unable to reduce price, or (2) "imperfections"
exist in the capital market that prevent the rivals from acquiring the
necessary capital to offer an equivalent inducement. 167 Since theory
suggests that such imperfections will not exist, the inability to match
price reductions suggests that the rivals are less efficient.
In a sense, this theory turns on its head the view equating injury
to competitors with injury to competition: The fact that competitors
man Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U. Cm. L. REy. 157, 195-96
(1955).
165 See Means, supra note 77, at 150.
168 Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUm. L. REv. 401 (1965); Bork &
Bowman, supra note 76; to follow the argument in detail, see Director & Levi, Law and
Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U.L. Rav. 281 (1956); Telser, Abusive Trade Practices:
An Economic Analysis, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 488 (1965).
167 A good deal of disagreement exists on whether the capital market is "imperfect."
Part of the disagreement seems to be a dispute on what shall constitute an "imperfection."
This would certainly be a fruitful line of inquiry for a congressional committee. In par-
ticular, it would be worth knowing whether capital for new entrants is harder to obtain
if there are interlocks between investment bankers and existing firms in the industry the
seeker of capital intends to enter.
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are injured suggests that the competitive process is working well. Since
most commentators agree that the dominant goal of the antitrust laws
is to preserve the competitive process, we may ignore the asserted inter-
ests of the competitors. 168
Vertical interlocks have a property that makes this theory peculiarly
applicable to them: Of all forms of vertical integration, integration by
interlocks is the flimsiest.169 If the integration is by consolidation of
assets, subsequent disengagement often proves impossibly compli-
cated.170 Integration by stock ownership may also be difficult to dissolve
because the dumping of stock on the market may so depress its price
that a large loss is incurred.' 71 No safe generalization may be made
about integration by contract, except that the longer the contract term,
the more difficult it is to discontinue the arrangement. For example,
exclusive-dealing contracts tying up the bulk of customers by the domi-
nant supplier may be justified if there is a strong customer interest in
the arrangement and the contracts last no more than one year.72 Unless
the boards of the interlocked companies are classified, the continuance
of the interlock is ordinarily subject to annual review by each control
group.1'73 If either group believes that the continuance of the relation-
ship for another year would not be in the best interests of the enter-
prise, it has only to refuse to reelect the director. There is no obstacle
to disengagement from the other firm if the market is offering better
goods or better terms.
1'7 4
The theoretical critique of conventional foreclosure theory is thus
peculiarly applicable to interlocks. Other forms of vertical integration
may persist long after they cease to be advantageous to both firms. For
example, a large number of customers may be induced to enter long
term exclusive-dealing contracts with the seller who, at that moment, is
producing the brand with the most customer acceptance. A competing
seller who thereafter produces a superior brand will be unable to secure
those outlets unless his product is so superior that the customers will
168 Cf. Turner, supra note 69, at 63.
169 Kessler & Stern, supra note 141, at 2-8, have noted that different forms of vertical
integration vary in the extent to which they require commitment by the firm or allow
future flexibility.
170 ATr'y GEN. NAT'L ANTIUST Comm. REP. 353-57 (1955). See generally Fraidin,
Dissolution and Reconstruction: A Structural Remedy and Alternatives, 33 Gao. WAsH.
L. R v. 899 (1965).
171 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316 (1961). A forced
sale often had adverse tax effects as well until Congress amended the Internal Revenue
Code to afford relief. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301(f), 1111.
172 United States v. American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 18, 31 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
173 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Ac § 33, 2.02 (1960).
174 See generally Travers, Removal of the Corporate Director During His Term of
Office, 53 IowA L. Rav. 389 (1967).
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incur the cost of dissolving their contracts to get it. Thus, viewed
dynamically, the more permanent forms of vertical integration may
operate as a temporary clog on the adjustments that competition would
otherwise induce. Vertical interlocks do not pose this problem.
The argument against intervention comes to this. The objective of
the antitrust laws is the preservation of the competitive process. No
convincing theoretical argument has been advanced to prove that verti-
cal integration, in any form, can injure that process. Although some
forms of vertical integration might impede competitive adjustments,
a vertical interlock creates no impediments. Observable harm to com-
petitors of one or both of the interlocked firms may occur, but, this
proves nothing by itself. The harm may be merely the result of
efficiencies produced by the interlock, which may often be anticipated.
Since a vertical interlock may produce efficiencies and seems to have
small potential for injuring competition, it should not be the object of
the antitrust laws.
In spite of this, a case may be made for outlawing at least some
vertical interlocks. First, independent value must be given the interest
of competitors as distinct from the public interest in competition. The
major reason for so doing, as Dean Bok has pointed out, is that we are
unable to gauge precisely the impact on competition of any particular
arrangement 7 5 By contrast, the injury to a competitor is often quite
tangible.'7 6 However appealing the theoretical case against interven-
ing may be, it goes against the grain to sacrifice individuals in the
name of a theory that is only now becoming articulated.
Once it is decided to give protection to the interests of competitors,
the next question is whether the interest of the interlocked firms in
getting the best possible deal gives the competitors adequate protection.
In many cases the answer is no. One of the interlocked firms will have
an incentive to dissolve the bond only if it believes it can get a better
deal in the market. So long as the firm with which it is linked can match
the market price and terms, the interlock will tend to persist. An
analogous situation is presented by a tying contract with a "competitive
terms" proviso. 7 7 In the International Salt case, the Supreme Court
held a system of tying contracts containing such a proviso invalid: 78
. . . The "Lixator" provision does, of course, afford a
measure of protection to the lessee of the tying product, but it
175 Bok, supra note 126, at 295-97.
178 Cf. id. at 293.
177 See Turner, supra note 69, at 60-61.
178 International Salt Co. v. United States, 852 U.S. 592 (1947).
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does not avoid the stifling effect of the agreement on competi-
tion. The appellant had at all times a priority on the business
at equal prices. A competitor would have to undercut appel-
lant's price to have any hope of capturing the market, while
appellant could hold that market by merely meeting competi-
tion. We do not think this concession relieves the contract of
being a restraint of trade, albeit a less harsh one than would
result in the absence of such a provision.179
The magnitude of the injury to competitors will depend largely
on the share of the market thus foreclosed to them. If the share is small,
there may be little or no impact. If it is substantial, they may be seri-
ously disadvantaged. For example, if the interlocked buyer purchases
twenty-five percent of the commodities sold, competitors of the inter-
locked seller may be seriously injured if the interlocked seller increases
his share of the market through his "unfair advantage." Thus, if there
are ten sellers, each with ten percent of the market, an interlock be-
tween one of them and a buyer of twenty-five percent of the product
does not by itself amount to foreclosure. But suppose the interlocked
seller is able to expand his output without increasing or decreasing
his unit costs. His share of the market will expand although he is no
more efficient than his competitors. 8 0 The interlocked buyer will get as
good a deal as is available and need not worry that his present seller
will get a monopoly; the firms with seventy-five percent of the market
afford him enough protection against that.
The competitors of the seller, however, are in for a rough time.
They cannot maintain their present outputs unless they lower prices
enough to increase the demand for the commodity. Their costs, how-
ever, may not permit this. They may be able to reduce their output
to the point that the market is cleared at the going price. But this too
may prove risky if it means producing at a less efficient level than the
interlocked seller; the latter may decide to exploit this advantage to
expand his share still further. Even if the competitors are able to reduce
their output without any sacrifice in efficiency, they are forced to accept
a truncated market because one of their rivals was able to tie up a
buyer.
Arguably, under the circumstances outlined, the law ought not to
179 Id. at 397.
180 Although it is partly built on guesswork, the bulk of professional opinion holds
that a firm's average cost curve will decline until a minimum optimal scale is reached and
thereafter remain horizontal for a considerable range of outputs. See J. BAIN, Supra note
90, at 155; Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J. LAw & ECON. 54 (1958). In an industry in
which all firms have barely attained a minimum optimal scale, the enlargement of the
share of the market by any one of them will not increase its efficiency.
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intervene. First, some efficiencies are theoretically possible; these are
beneficial to the consumer. Secondly, there is little need to protect one
party to the interlock against "coercion" since he can dissolve it him-
self. Thirdly, competitors may be injured even though no efficiencies
are achieved, but no concomitant injury may occur to the competitive
process. Even if the interests of the competitors are acknowledged as
worthy of protection, it may be impossible to determine in a given case
whether the injury to competitors is a result of the superior efficiency
of the integrated firm. Knowing only that competitors are injured, the
courts or the FTC may begin to equate that injury with an injury to
the competitive process and thus invalidate interlocks that produce
efficiency.'81 This is little different from striking down interlocks be-
cause they are more efficient.
Since past experience suggests that this fear is far from ground-
less, 1812 there is need to appraise the efficiencies that might be lost if it
came to pass. First, it would seem that an interlock will not result in
the sort of economies in production that may be produced by more
permanent forms of integration. The plants of the linked firms will not
be fused physically by any interlock. There are, however, other effi-
ciencies that allegedly may result. It may be possible to coordinate the
successive stages more completely, and certain "transfer" costs, which
would have to be incurred if the transactions were made through the
market, may be eliminated. 188 Of course, the very ease of disengagement
that reduces the threat to competition of an interlock restricts the
extent to which confident long-range planning is possible. But there is
a more fundamental objection to "efficiencies" of this sort. Since the
interlock will not of itself affect the stability of the ultimate demand
for the product, it cannot eliminate all uncertainty. Planning seems to
be facilitated only to the extent that the interlocked firms need not
worry about their calculations being upset by the intrusions of com-
petitors. 8 In other words, a firm may be able to reduce its costs if it
does not have to worry about competition. "Efficiencies" of that sort
hardly seem to be entitled to great weight under the antitrust laws. It
must be recognized that waste will result under any competitive regime
that might be established. 85 Antitrust policy cannot pursue each effi-
181 See Bork & Bowman, supra note 76, at 369.
182 See, e.g., Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954); Dictograph
Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954).
183 See Means, supra note 77, at 148.
184 Cf. Bok, supra note 126, at 306-07.
t85 K. BouLunic, EcoNomic ANAi.ytss 671-78 (8d ed. 1955).
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ciency so single-mindedly that it is -willing to encourage even those
efficiencies that result from the relaxation of competition.
Where does all this leave us? On the one hand, a vertical inter-
lock does have some potential for efficiencies, but the efficiencies ap-
pear either insignificant or of a type entitled to little weight. On the
other hand, the dangers posed by interlocks hardly seem substantial.
Because of the ease with which either firm can dissolve the relation,
they may ordinarily be relied upon to protect their own interests.
This same fragility minimizes any chance that the interlock will in-
jure the competitive process. The possibility cannot be excluded, how-
ever, that there may be cases in which harm is inflicted on individual
competitors even though no social value results from the interlock.
Everything else being equal, the degree of harm may be roughly
gauged by the share of the market from which competitors are fore-
closed by the interlock. It should be emphasized that these conclu-
sions are little more than speculations made in the absence of solid
data. Nevertheless, Congress has a decision to make.
Congress may pursue one of several alternatives. It could pro-
hibit only interlocks that "substantially lessened competition or tended
to create a monopoly" or met some other vague standard. It could for-
bid all interlocks between supplier and customer wherever the sup-
plier produced a specified share of the relevant market or the customer
purchased a specified share of the relevant market. Or it could pro-
ceed similarly to section 10 of the Clayton Act and require that every
customer linked to a supplier by an interlock purchase the supplier's
goods under a system of competitive bidding. Section 10 requires com-
petitive bidding if the supplier and the carrier sharing a director have
annual dealings in excess of 50,000 dollars. Since the interest to be
protected is the interest of competitors in not being foreclosed, which
is roughly related to the share of the market involved, the statute might
well require competitive bidding only when the supplier produces a
specified share of the relevant market or the customer buys a specified
share.
This last option has much to recommend it. Enactment of a gen-
eralized standard would cut the courts adrift and invite the same vac-
illation that has occurred under similar standards of the antitrust laws.
An outright prohibition on vertical interlocks if one of the firms ac-
counts for a critical share of the relevant market seems too severe. Any
figure selected is bound to be arbitrary, and the effect of the ban would
be a major intervention into the executive-talent market. A competi-
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tive bidding system, however, does not require the same degree of in-
tervention. Although the system of competitive bidding may be more
cumbersome and expensive for the firms involved, this is a factor to
be taken into the calculations of the firms contemplating an interlock.
If a firm can decide that an individual is the best man for the job al-
though he has other commitments, it can also make the judgment that
he is worth the trouble and cost of a competitive bidding system. The
extent to which this will force firms to make a compromise with qual-
ity depends on whether a firm's buying a particular supply by com-
petitive bids will be so expensive that this factor can induce the firm
to select a candidate who would be considered demonstrably inferior.
One hesitates to suggest the percentage of the market that would
call the competitive bidding system into play. Since the consequences
of coming within the percentage are less severe than would ordinarily
be the case, Congress might well be warranted in resolving doubts in
favor of a small percentage. Here too the desire to promote equality
of opportunity might also weigh in favor of a small percentage.
G. Interlocks Between Potential Competitors and Between Potential
Customers and Suppliers
Any attempt to legislate against interlocks between corporations
that are only "potentially" related must somehow confine the judicial
imagination.18 6 In this era of diversification, any corporation could con-
ceivably become the competitor of any other corporation. That a given
corporation may become the customer or supplier of any other corpora-
tion is even more likely, and it is not terribly difficult to conjure up
cases that would be within the statute if the concept of "potentiality"
is left unconfined. Indeed, it is not too much to say that unless Con-
gress sets up boundaries to the concept of "potentiality" or, at the very
least, guidelines that permit the courts to chart those boundaries, en-
actment of the proposed amendment might well be tantamount to
forbidding all interlocking relations. If it is unsound for Congress to
go this far directly, it seems even more unsound for Congress to do
the same thing by indirection. What then are the bounds that might
be imposed?
As to interlocks between potential competitors, a theoretical case
for the protection of potential competition already exists; the Supreme
Court has seemingly invalidated a joint venture on the ground that
186 See generally Hale & Hale, Potential Competition Under Section 7: The Supreme
Court's Crystal Ball, 1964 Sup. CT. RE V. 171.
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potential competition between the firms would be impaired.st This
theory distinguishes between two cases. First, although not presently
in the same market, the firms may exert present influence on each
other's behavior. Thus, if one firm is geographically outside the mar-
ket, firms within the market may recognize that the outsider may en-
ter the market if conditions are right. Accordingly, they may behave
in a manner more consistent with competitive objectives. Secondly,
although not recognized as a potential entrant and not exercising any
present influence on the behavior of firms inside the market, an out-
side firm may nevertheless have the potential for entry.188
As applied to interlocks this distinction seems to work out in the
following manner. If the interlocked firms recognize each other as
potential competitors at the time the interlock is established, the mo-
tive for its establishment may be the relaxation of the influence of
this potential competition. On the other hand, even if the firms do
not regard each other as potential competitors when the interlock is
established, its existence may prevent the firms from affecting each
other's behavior at some future time. Thus, suppose that Corporation
A shares a director with Corporation B and that neither was recog-
nized as a potential entrant into the other's market when the inter-
lock began. Later A may have to decide whether to enter B's market
or to use its resources in some other way. The interlock with B may
divert it into other areas.
Is an outright prohibition warranted in either case? On balance,
the answer must be "No." Although it may be acknowledged that a
recognized potential entrant may affect the behavior of firms in the
industry it may enter, certain minimum conditions must be met be-
fore that influence can be regarded as significant. The industry must
be maintaining prices above competitive levels; the firm must be rec-
ognized as one of the more likely entrants; and entry barriers must be
low enough to permit the entering firm to set a price no higher than
the price that would maximize the profits of the existing sellers.18 9
These are only minimum conditions; other conditions may also have
to be met before the influence of the outside firm is so important that
an interlock would be employed to negate it. The occasions on which
this would be true are few. If these conditions are not met, an inter-
lock between two firms that seem to an enforcement agency or a court
187 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
188 Turner, supra note 162, at 1362.
189 Id. at 1363. ,
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to be potential competitors may be motivated by honestly competitive
objectives. It is very doubtful, however, that a statute can be drawn
that, by its terms, will make these rather fine distinctions. In the cir-
cumstances, it seems the wiser course to leave the whole problem to
the more flexible standards of the Sherman and FTC Acts.
The same reasoning applies with greater force when the firms are
assumed not to have recognized each other as potential competitors
when the interlock was created. In addition, two other factors now
seem present. First, proof of the fact that the two firms are, in actu-
ality, potential competitors will most likely be difficult to unearth.
Secondly, if each firm is maximizing profits, it is doubtful that the
interlock would divert either firm's energies into an area that was de-
monstrably less profitable. Only when entering the industry of the
other firm appears no more profitable than some other use of the re-
sources is the interlock likely to tip the scale. Admitting that imper-
fections in knowledge may require some guess work by the firm, one
would surmise that the close cases will not predominate.
Concerning interlocks between potential suppliers and customers,
the theoretical case is not clear. Some actual transactions would seem
requisite to the foreclosure of competitors at either level. But, of
course, as soon as the transactions commence, the firms are no longer
potentially related. It seems that expanding section 8 to reach in-
terlocks between "potential" customers and suppliers adds little pro-
tection to a ban on interlocks between firms having existing vertical
relations.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis has suggested seven conclusions about in-
terlocks. (1) There is value in intervening in the "executive-talent"
market only to the extent necessary to achieve clearly defined objec-
tives. (2) Attempting to regulate interlocks on a theory of increasing
individual opportunity or preventing the development of an elite seems
unwise. These justifications invite massive intervention into the ex-
ecutive-talent market since they do not discriminate between classes
of interlocks. (3) The present per se rule for interlocking directorates
between competitors seems justified. (4) The logic that supports
the preceding conclusion will also justify extending section 8 to in-
terlocking officers and employees with managerial functions between
competitors. (5) Though indirect interlocking relations between com-
petitors may serve some of the same functions as direct interlocks,
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it would not be worthwhile going after these in their own right. (6)
The case against vertical interlocks is not so clear. Its theoretical basis
is now under direct attack. Yet the antitrust laws have given protec-
tion to competitors in many other cases, and theory, however appeal-
ing, is ordinarily. deemed insufficient to justify the sacrifice of com-
petitors. However, in view of the doubts, an outright prohibition on
vertical interlocks is too severe. A system of competitive bidding, to
be employed when either of the interlocked firms accounts for a crit-
ical share of the relevant market, seems the better solution. (7) Ex-
panding section 8 to cover interlocks between potential competitors
and potential customers and suppliers would invite confusion. It
would be better to remit this problem to the courts to allow for an
evolutionary approach that could take account of the most relevant
factors.
